The Case Against Reality

Donald Hoffman is a Professor of Cognitive Science at the University of California, Irvine. He is known for his studies in visual perception and optical illusion, as documented in his 1998 book Visual Intelligence: How We Create What We See, and at his webpage. These optical illusions got him interested in thinking about whether our visual perceptions are veridical at […]

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Won’t Get Foiled Again – A Rejoinder to Jerry Walls

A couple of months ago (February 2016), Philosophia Christi published my and Steve Cowan’s rejoinder to Jerry Walls’s reply to our response to his original article on Christian compatibilism. Our abstract: Jerry Walls has attempted to make the case that no orthodox Christian should embrace compatibilism. We responded to his arguments, challenging four key premises. In his most […]

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The Basis of Counterfactual Repentance

A comment on “Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Molinism.” In Acts 7, Stephen preaches a narrative that culminates in the prophetic witness concerning “the coming of the Righteous One” (v. 52). In Acts 8:1 Saul was present to hear this, approving of Stephen’s execution. No doubt Saul was conversant with other Christian preaching as well, as he […]

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Are Molinist Distinctives Found in the Bible?

RTS philosopher James Anderson has an interesting post which asks the question, “How Biblical is Molinism?” He concludes that there is strong biblical support for two theses held by Molinism: “God’s comprehensive providential control over his creation” and “God’s counterfactual knowledge of human choices.” But he points out that the latter kind of knowledge doesn’t […]

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A Response to Jerry Walls on Christian Compatibilism

In Philosophia Christi Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 2011), Christian philosopher Jerry Walls published “Why No Classical Theist, Let Alone Orthodox Christian, Should Ever Be a Compatibilist.” The abstract (article available here): I argue that no classical theist, and even more no orthodox Christian, should affirm compatibilism in our world. However plausible compatibilism may be on atheistic […]

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Before and after

How running* can help demonstrate to your metaphysics class the difference between a thick particular and a thin particular: Before: (2008) After: (2011) *for a year in 2011, in my living room, while watching MI-5. This has been a public service announcement… (And please, don’t ask me to take the next logical step by trying […]

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Our experience of libertarian free will

Flickers of Freedom is a nice blog, with contributors who are among the philosophical movers and shakers in the contemporary free will debate. This month’s guest contributor is Marcus Arvan, and my memory was jogged by a comment he made on one of his recent posts: Another obvious source of trouble for Kant (the one that […]

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Surrejoinder to Omelianchuk on the Free Will Defense

Adam Omelianchuk’s rejoinder to my reply to his response to my criticism of Plantinga’s ‘free will defense’ (whew!) contains many interesting thoughts on monotheletism, dyotheletism, anhypostasis, and Nestorianism. But I think I can assess our exchange without having to further descend into those details. It now occurs to me that when I wrote that student […]

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